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1. High unemployment and stabilisation policy in Europe
1. US and European labour markets have one important feature in common: A 
significant part of the supply of labour is not occupied in the very productive 
primary sector of the economy. However, there is also a striking difference: In 
Europe, most of those who are not employed in the primary sector remain 
unemployed, whereas, in the United States, they work in a less productive 
secondary sector. This difference is usually explained by Europe's generous 
system of unemployment benefits. Individuals who cannot get a job in the primary 
sector prefer being unemployed to working in the secondary sector where 
incomes are low and uncertain. Moreover, it is claimed that the high costs of 
some European welfare states in general diminish profitable employment 
opportunities. From this point of view, the policy recommended to reduce 
Europe's high unemployment is to restructure the European economies according 
to the pattern of the US economy. Familiar proposals are to cut back the welfare 
state, and in particular, to diminish unemployment benefits in order to provide 
incentives for the unemployed to look for a job.
The basic structure of the European and the US labour market reveals, 
however, that both markets share the apparent inability to employ a higher 
proportion of their labour supply in the productive primary sector. Hence, it 
seems more relevant to ask the question why this should be so. The answer that 
most workers outside the primary sector are inherently unproductive is too simple 
and not supported by the empirical evidence. A closer inspection of the historical 
record shows that one of the reasons might be a fairly rigorous anti-inflationary 
policy which keeps the rate of productive employment down, in order to stabilise 
the price level. Empirical data indicate that the endeavour of central banks to 
keep inflation rates down has, indeed, been accompanied by a reduction in the 
rate of employment in the primary sector. If this observation is correct, the 
monetary authorities have apparently used some trade-off between inflation and 
the rate of unemployment in the primary sector of the economy. According to this 
view, the loss of employment in the primary sector is simply the price which has 
to be paid for a stable price level, both in Europe and in the United States. But 
then the unpleasant conclusion for the European economies is once more that they 
waste the human resources which cannot be used in the primary sector, whereas 
these resources are employed at least in the secondary sector in the United States.
2. Before jumping to this conclusion, it seems reasonable to ask whether one 
should really recommend a rigorous stabilisation policy at the price of a 
significantly reduced rate of employment in the primary sector of the economy. 



























































































which does not immediately react to each inflationary pressure and which 
tolerates temporary inflation, if in this way a considerably, higher average 
proportion of a country's labour supply could be employed in the productive 
sector. This could also change the general attitude towards the welfare state. One 
can imagine that the optimal level of welfare expenditures depends essentially on 
the rate of employment of the primary sector, and that in a very productive 
economy the welfare state, and especially unemployment compensation, would 
not be considered such a heavy burden. According to this view, the demand for a 
cutback of the welfare state in European countries may be to some degree only a 
reflection of their low rate of employment, and hence, of a rigorous stabilisation 
policy.
This is not to deny the importance of a well conceived stabilisation policy aimed 
at keeping inflation within limits. Without such a policy, one would have to 
expect a strong inherent tendency towards a high rate of employment or even full 
employment in the primary sector. The employees of this sector would have a 
very strong position in the labour market, because there would be no competition 
from outside this sector. They would use this position to demand and enforce 
higher wages. The firms, in which they are employed, would attempt to keep real 
wages down by raising their prices. The result would be an inflationary process 
characterised by some unexpected inflation. This is a very undesirable state of 
affairs for several reasons, but especially because it usually hurts creditors who 
have to expect losses because the repayment of a loan will be worth less than 
they had anticipated. The likely consequence will be that the growth of the 
country's capital stock is retarded, because savings go down and capital is 
invested in countries with no or with less unanticipated inflation . It is obvious 
that the welfare losses of such a development could be intolerably high.
Therefore, the implementation of a stabilisation policy which controls 
unexpected inflation is necessary. It is widely acknowledged that there exists a 
rate of employment at which this target can be achieved. The corresponding 
unemployment rate is known as "non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment" 
(Nairu). Although the usual definition refers to the overall unemployment rate of 
an economy, it should here be understood as the share of the labour supply which 
is not employed in the primary sector. The crucial condition for an inflation-free 
economy is that the demand for higher wages in the primary sector is sufficiently 
constrained by a competitive pressure from outside. It doesn't matter whether this 
pressure comes from those employed in the secondary sector or from the 
unemployed.
It is also acknowledged, however, that it is impossible to keep the 




























































































effective stabilisation policy can avoid fluctuations around such a position. 
Hence, if the target is Nairu, the economy will still occasionally move into the 
inflationary domain. A rigorous stabilisation policy, which aims at preventing an 
unexpected inflation altogether, would have to choose a target rate of 
employment so far to the left of Nairu that even large positive deviations would 
not bring the economy into the inflationary regime. Such a policy would be 
dangerous if it merely substituted an unexpected inflation by an unexpected 
deflation, because the latter is hardly less expensive (in terms of welfare losses) 
than the former. However, in most industrialised countries a deflation is 
prevented by downward rigid money wages. This fact indeed offers an 
opportunity to choose a target rate of employment which prevents an unexpected 
inflation without at the same provoking an unanticipated deflation.
Monetary authorities frequently opt for such a rigorous stabilisation policy 
because they are convinced that this is in the best interest of the economy. Even if 
they are not convinced per se, they may be forced to imitate such a policy if it is 
used in other countries. A country risks losing capital to inflation-free countries, if 
it permits unexpected inflation, even if this is only moderate and temporary. For 
analogous reasons, competition for capital between countries may lead to a race 
for more stability ending in the rigorous stabilisation policy defined above.
3. The problem of such a policy is that it may require a fairly low average rate of 
employment in the primary sector. If the consequence of this is persistent 
unemployment, a certain proportion of the unemployed would become long-term 
unemployed. But long-term unemployed individuals tend to lose their productive 
capacity, and sooner or later they drop out of the labour force. Hence, the 
effective labour supply would tend to decline. As the target rate of employment 
refers to this effective supply of labour, the total rate of unemployment which 
refers to the total labour force would rise. The final result could be an intolerably 
high rate of unemployment.
In this case, it might indeed be preferable to cut unemployment benefits in 
order to induce people to search a job. This would not only reduce the high rate 
of unemployment, but - more importantly - it would help to preserve the 
productive capacity of the individuals and hence stabilise the effective supply of 
labour. A rigorous stabilisation policy might therefore create some strong political 
pressure to reduce or even remove the support of the unemployed. Furthermore, it 
is easier for a country to stick to a rigorous stabilisation policy, if it has a low 
value of Nairu, because then the loss of employment in the primary sector is less 
severe. One of the most promising ways of reducing Nairu is a contraction of 
public spending and especially of the welfare state. When the tax burden of 




























































































pressure would arise only at higher rates of employment. Moreover, lower taxes 
can stimulate savings and in that way increase employment opportunities through 
a higher stock of capital. In this respect, a particularly promising policy seems to 
be a reduction of taxes on capital income. By this measure, countries sometimes 
even endeavour to attract foreign capital, although it is obvious that such a policy 
is futile if all countries tried to pursue it.
Yet, this outcome of a rigorous stabilisation policy could be far from 
optimal, because it is compatible with a reasonable unemployment rate only at a 
rather high price. Those who are not employed in the primary sector are forced to 
accept a badly paid and uncertain job in the secondary sector. The overall level of 
welfare is reduced, and the promotion of capital formation is likely to benefit 
capital at the expense of labour.
4. From this perspective, a moderate stabilisation policy, which stabilises the 
economy around Nairu, should be taken more seriously.First of all, it would 
allow a higher rate of employment in the primary sector. Second, in this case, a 
radical reduction of welfare expenditures, especially of unemployment benefits, 
would probably turn out to be unnecessary and even undesirable. Certainly, this 
kind of stabilisation policy would occasionally tolerate some unexpected 
inflation, which could negatively affect the capital stock of the economy. But the 
impact could be small, because any unanticipated inflation would be temporary 
and moderate.
However, the transition from a rigorous to a moderate stabilisation policy 
could be a difficult task. Once a rigorous stabilisation policy and its supporting 
measures have been established world-wide, it is almost impossible for a single 
country to abandon them. A moderate stabilisation policy and a more generous 
welfare state would probably provoke an outflow of capital which would 
jeopardise the attempt to raise the rate of employment. Hence, the shift to a 
moderate stabilisation policy could only be inaugurated in a co-ordinated way. All 
countries involved would have to commit to this kind of policy.
The following sections analyse these claims and conclusions within the 
framework of a simple macroeconomic model. The model is of the Nairu type, 
where Nairu is determined by the consistency of wage claims and prices (see, for 
example, Carlin and Soskice, 1990, Manning, 1995, some of the articles in Dixon 
and Rankin, 1995, and Vogt, 1996). The analysis is intended to show that there is 





























































































2. A macroeconomic model
2.1 The basic structure of the model
1. The purpose of this section is to describe the model of an economy with two 
sectors of production, a "primary" and a "secondary" sector. Labour productivity 
is very high in the primary sector, but rather low and uncertain in the secondary 
sector.
In the primary sector, a given number of commodities is produced. Each 
commodity is produced by a different firm which has some advantage in its 
production due to some specific initial endowment (e.g. some special 
knowledge). Apart from this difference, firms are identical, i.e. they have the 
same technologies and costs. Also, demand for these commodities is symmetrical 
so that all commodities are produced and sold in equal amounts. Hence, one can 
say that there is a composite commodity consisting of equal amounts of all single 
goods. This composite commodity can be used for (private and public) 
consumption and for the formation of capital.
The inputs of production are capital and homogeneous labour. The 
production function of a representative firm is
(1) Y = Kf(Negl/K) = kf(n/k)Legl, k:=K/Legl, n:=N/L .
Here, Y is production, K is capital and N is the number of employees. There are 
constant returns to scale with respect to capital and labour, and diminishing 
returns to each separate factor of production, i.e. f>0, f'<0. g>0 indicates a 
labour saving technical progress. One could think of treating the rate of technical 
progress as an endogenous variable as in the new growth theory. It seems, 
however, that not much would be gained for the purpose of the intended analysis 
and that it is preferable to keep the analysis as simple as possible, k is the level at 
which the stock of capital grows at the rate g. L indicates a constant labour 
supply, and n is the rate of employment in the primary sector. Correspondingly, 
1 -n is the proportion of the labour supply which is not employed in this sector.
The macroeconomic background of the analysis can be emphasised if one 
assumes that there is a continuum of commodities and firms on the closed interval 
[0,1], because then the variables are identical to macroeconomic aggregates, i.e. 
Y is total production of the primary sector, K is the capital stock and N is the 
number of employees in this sector.





























































































r f ( n / k ) - f ' ( n / k ) n / k  
w f ' ( n / k )
Here, r is the rate of interest, w is the real wage, and w = We8' , so that w is the 
level at which the real wage grows at the rate g.
2. In a small open economy, the rate of interest is determined by the conditions of 
the global capital market. In this case
(3a) r = r ,
where r is the world rate of interest. Together with the real wage it determines 
the equilibrium value of the labour intensity of production, n/k. For all countries 
together, or in a closed economy, this intensity is determined by the accumulation 
of capital which in turn implies a certain equilibrium rate of interest. The 
accumulation of capital can be explained by the assumption that a constant 
proportion s (0<s<l) of the primary sector's production is saved and invested in 
the capital good. The rate of change of capital is then given by $ =  sfK, and hence 
the level of the capital stock of the economy develops according to
#/k = sf(n/k) - g
A steady state is reached when the level of capital and the rate of employment 
obey the condition
(3b) f(n/k) = g/s.
In this case, n/k is determined by the parameters g and s, which are (for analytical 
convenience) assumed here as given. When n/k exceeds its steady state value, the 
level of capital rises, and when n/k is below its steady state value, k falls.
3. In the secondary sector, a consumption good can be produced which is a 
perfect substitute for the composite commodity. The only factor of production is 
labour. Labour productivity is a random variable x with a distribution function 
O(x) and an expected value Ex = x . Total production of the secondary sector is
(4) X = (L-N)es'x.
Productivity in this sector is distinctly lower than in the primary sector, i.e, x «  f(n/k).
4. The total labour force of the economy is L. L < L is the (inelastic) supply of 




























































































some part of it may go to the secondary sector, and there may also be some 
unemployment.
5. Commodity markets and the secondary labour market are competitive. 
Employees of the primary sector have some bargaining power, because there are 
positive real entry costs coe for individuals who want to move from the secondary 
sector or from unemployment to the primary sector. It is assumed that these costs 
rise with an increasing rate of employment in the primary sector, i.e. log = ©E(n), 
C0E'(n) > 0.
6. It is assumed that money is in some way essential for production and exchange. 
The money price of the composite commodity is P. At this price, the demand for 
the good of the secondary sector (which is a perfect substitute) is completely 
elastic, so that P is also the equilibrium price of this good. The money wage is W 
= Wep , where W is the level at which W grows at the rate g. A supply of 
money, M, is provided by the state and determined by the monetary authorities. 
Total demand for all commodities depends positively on the real balances M/P. 
The familiar equilibrium condition is
(5) Y + X = D(M/P), D '> 0,
where D is a macroeconomic demand function and Y = Ygel, X = Xget.
7. Readers will perhaps miss the microeconomic foundations of labour supply, 
consumption demand, capital accumulation, and the role of money. There are two 
reasons for this omission. First, it seems preferable to keep the analysis as clear 
and simple as possible. It would be rather straightforward to derive labour supply, 
consumption demand, and also capital formation in the usual way from first 
principles (as, for example, in Phelps 1994). Second, however, there is still no 
reliable bridge from an intertemporal microeconomic analysis with uncertainty on 
one hand, to capital and money in macroeconomic models on the other. Hence, ad 
hoc assumptions, as in equations (3b) and (5), seem still preferable to 
sophisticated, but doubtful microeconomic explanations.
The only explicit assumption about utility functions is that the utility of an 
individual who supplies labour can be expressed by u-e . Here, e>0 indicates the 
costs of being employed, i.e. e=0 for unemployed individuals, u is a (concave) 
utility function , which increases with the real disposable income of an individual, 
and with the size of the welfare state. The real disposable income of an employee 
of the primary sector is his/her real wage, minus his/her contributions to the 




























































































secondary sector, and b for unemployed individuals, where b is the level at which 
unemployment benefits grow at the rate g.
2.2 Competitive prices, wage bargaining, and the real wage
1. The following considerations concern the primary sector of the economy. 
Under perfect competition, the price of each commodity would equal the average 
costs of production. However, the specific initial endowment of each firm permits 
a somewhat higher price and a corresponding rent (profit) of the firm. Under this 
condition, competitive prices are determined by a mark up m on average costs, 
where m is a given positive parameter. Furthermore it is assumed that the price of 
each commodity is set before the prices of the factors of production are known 
with certainty. Thus the price P of a commodity which is identical to the general 
price level is determined by the expected average costs CE , which are given by
CE = [WEN+rPEK]/Y = [WEn/k+rPE] /f .
The superscript E indicates expected values. W is the money wage, and W = We' 
gt is the level at which the money wage grows at the rate g. PE is the expected 
price of the composite commodity.
It is shown below (see equation (8d)} that WE/PE = W/P. Together with 
equation (2), it follows that expected average costs are equal to expected 
marginal costs (this is simply implied by constant returns to scale):
CE = WE/f(n/k),
1. e. CE equals the ratio of the expected money wage to the marginal productivity 
of labour.
The competitive price is then given by 
(6) P = (1+m) w E/f(n/k).
At this price, the market of each firm is contestable. It is assumed that the 
monopoly price of the market would be higher. Hence, each firm takes the 
competitive price as a given parameter. As this price exceeds the average costs, 
each firm would like to produce and supply as much of its product as possible.
2. The money wage of the primary sector is determined by bargaining. Under 
perfect competition, it would correspond to a reservation wage (Or , which is 




























































































unemployment benefits. However, competition is constrained by costs of entry to 
the primary sector, (De- This gives those who are employed in this sector some 
bargaining power. An employer can replace one of his employees by an outsider 
only if he adds the outsider's entry cost to the reservations wage (Or . Hence, cor + 
ct>E is the maximum real wage which he is willing to concede. The minimum 
demand of an employee is equal to his/her outside option o>r . Depending on the 
respective bargaining power, the bargained real wage will therefore lie 
somewhere in the interval between (Or and (Or + (Oe- This shows that the entry 
costs (Or provide some rent which can be shared by employers and employees. 
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, it can be assumed that 
employees are able to obtain the whole rent, so that the bargained money wage is 
determined by
(7) W = co^, (0 := (Or + (Oe.
In accordance with the determination of the price level, it is likewise assumed 
here that the money wage depends on the expected price level, because it has to 
be fixed before the true price level is revealed.
The bargained real wage (0 will depend on the rate of employment n. It is 
assumed that entry costs are positively related to the rate of employment, (Oe = 
(0£(n) and (Oe’>0. On the other hand, it is shown below that (Or may be a 
decreasing function of the same variable, (Or = (0R(n) and (OR’(n)<0. It seems 
reasonable to assume that, for all relevant values of n, the positive effect of the 
entry costs dominates the perhaps negative effect of the reservation wage, so that 
(o'(n) > 0. Furthermore, it is assumed that the bargained real wage is always less 
then the marginal productivity of labour, because otherwise a firm would be 
expected to accept losses. It is possible, however, that the bargained real wage 
exceeds the real wage compatible with price setting in the commodity market. 
These assumptions on (o can be summarised in the following way:
(8) (o = (o(n), (o'(n) > 0, and f(n/k)/(l+m) < 0)(1) < f(n/k),
where n/k is determined by either (3a) or (3b).
3. The level of the real wage is w= W/P. If the money wage is correctly 





























































































This is a constant value, if (n/k) is determined by (3a) or (3b). If the price level is 
correctly expected, it follows from equation (7) that
(9b) w= oj(n),
i.e. according to (9), w is an increasing function of the rate of employment.
Figure 1 shows the graphs of (9a) and (9b).
W
For given wage and price expectations, the equations (6) and (7) show that the 
real wage is given by
(9c) w=co(n)fPE/(l+m)WE.
Which wage level will be expected when competitive prices are set? An apparent 
answer is that it must be the wage level which results from expected prices, so 
that
WE = co(n)PE . In this case, the competitive price level will be given by 
(6a) P = co(n)(l+m) PE/f.
In an analogous way, one can argue that the expected price level which 
determines the wage rate must be equal to the price level which is actually 
established, pn = (l+m)WE/ f . Then the bargained wage level would be set at




























































































The price and wage equations gained in this way imply that the real wage 
w=W/P must equal its expected value:
(9d) w=W/P =WE/PE.
Replacing WE/PE in equation (9c) by w yields the solution
(9) w = -̂ £0(n)f’(n /k )/(l+ in ).
Hence, the real wage is an average value of to and f/(l+m). At a given value of 
n/k it rises with the rate of employment, but less than co does. The condition (8) 
implies
(8a) f(n/k)/(l+m) < w (1) < co(l) < f(n/k).
At full employment, the real wage is less than the marginal productivity of labour 
so that there are still some profits, but it exceeds the real wage which would be 
consistent with the price level. This behaviour of the real wage is shown in figure 
1 by the dotted line.
2.3 The equilibrium rate of employment
1. In the primary sector of the economy, the price of each firm exceeds its 
average costs and hence also its marginal costs. This is certainly true for expected 
costs because the competitive price is set by a mark up on expected costs. The 
rather weak condition (8a) ensures that the price is also higher than the ex post 
value of marginal costs, P > W/f. As each firm acts as a price taker, it wants to 
produce as much as possible. The maximum amount of production is obtained 
when all resources are employed. Hence, there is an inherent tendency to full 
employment. The fact that the real wage rises when the rate of employment goes 
up does not obstruct this tendency, because it is due to an external effect. When a 
single firm employs more workers, it does not improve their bargaining power. 
The position of employees is improved only when all firms together expand their 
labour force. Even if this resulted in a reduction of profits, a single firm would 
have no incentive to behave in a different way. It would be in a typical prisoners’ 
dilemma.
However, full employment is a precarious state because it implies 
inconsistent expectations. At full employment, employees are in a particularly 
strong bargaining position. The desired real wage to(n) reaches its maximum 
value. Equations (6a) and (7a) together with (8a) imply P/PE = W/WE > 1. As the 




























































































unexpected inflation. There is a vast and still growing literature on the social 
costs of unexpected inflation (see, for example, Howitt 1990). For the present 
purpose it seems reasonable to focus on the potential losses of creditors whose ex 
post real return is less than they expected. A country with unanticipated inflation 
must fear an outflow of capital, because capital owners will look for more 
profitable investment opportunities in other countries, unless domestic firms offer 
a higher real rate of interest. For all countries together (or in a closed economy), 
an unanticipated inflation will reduce the rate of savings. In both cases, a 
country's capital stock will decline {see (3a) and (3b)}. (It is obvious that for a 
precise explanation of these statements, the inflationary process and its 
implications for individuals and firms would have to be specified).
2. This shows that full employment in the productive (primary) sector is no 
equilibrium, even if it were the outcome of unguided market forces. Consistent 
expectations require a rate of employment n*, at which
(10) to(n*) = f(n/k)/(l+m),
with n/k determined by (3a) or (3b). The corresponding value of n* (and also the 
conditions of its existence) can be seen in figure 1. This is the familiar "non 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment", Nairu. It is frequently claimed that 
Nairu, not full employment, would come about by unguided market forces, if the 
individual agents have rational (correct) expectations. However, in a monetary 
economy this view presumes an exogenous supply of money. The usual approach 
is to assume a macroeconomic demand function D(M/P), where M is the 
exogenous supply of money, and a macroeconomic supply function S(PE/P). Then 
NAIRU is obtained when the following three conditions are satisfied: First, 
equilibrium in the commodity market, S=D. Second, rational (or correct) 
expectations, P5 = P. Third, the supply of money is exogenous, M =M. It follows 
that S* = S(l) = D(M/P*). Here, S* corresponds to Nairu. This line of reasoning 
can be applied to the present model, if it is supplemented by the corresponding 
aggregate demand function (5) . The level of supply is given by Y + X = 
nLf(n/k)/(n/k) + nL(l-x). When expectations are rational (correct), the price 
equation (6) and the wage equation (7) are consistent at n*, i.e. Nairu. When the 
supply of money is exogenously given, the price level results from the equilibrium 
in the commodity market, n*L{f (n/k)/(n/k)-x ( = D(M/P*)-xL.
It is important to realise that rational or correct expectations are sufficient 
to establish Nairu only under the additional condition that the supply of money is 
exogenous (given the equilibrium in the commodity market). Thus, a state of full 
employment could prevail as long as the resulting inflation is financed by a 




























































































price level is determined by the price equation (6), given the expected wage level. 
Equilibrium in the commodity market determines the equilibrium value of real 
balances, M/P which is obtained by a continuous endogenous adjustment of M to 
P.
Viewed in this way, Nairu is not established merely by market forces as 
such, but by some deliberate monetary policy which determines the price level. 
Sacrificing some employment in the primary sector in order to stabilise the price 
level at Nairu is a reasonable policy, whenever the costs of an unexpected 
inflation are higher than the opportunity costs of a reduced production in this 
sector of the economy.
3. Stabilising the economy at Nairu does not mean that the monetary authorities 
are able to keep the economy continuously at this position. There will be 
fluctuations around Nairu, which can be explained by movements of the 
parameters of the economy, especially by oscillations of overall demand. It is 
commonly accepted that a monetary policy of "fine tuning" which tries to dampen 
or even eliminate these fluctuations is doomed to failure, because there are 
unavoidable lags of recognition, implementation, and of the impact of a policy 
action. What stabilisation policy can do is to bring about the conditions under 
which Nairu becomes a centre of gravitation, around which the economy can 
fluctuate. There are positive of negative deviations of the rate of employment n 
from its equilibrium value n*. Every deviation induces inconsistent expectations 
according to
(11) co(n) *  f(n/k)/(l+m) for n *  n* and n/k determined by (3a) or (3b).
Equation (6a) shows that there will be unexpected inflation (P>PE) if n>n*, and 
unexpected deflation (P<PE) if n<n*, but one could perhaps expect that in the 
long run inflation and deflation compensate so that the price level is stable on 
average. Nevertheless, there would still be some costs of unexpected movements 
of the price level, especially because there are also costs of unexpected deflation 
(comparable to those of unexpected inflation).
This description is not in accordance, however, with the empirical 
observation that there is hardly any deflation at all, and certainly no unexpected 
deflation. The reason for this is apparently that money wages are downward rigid. 
There is a lot of empirical evidence that this is in fact the case. Furthermore, there 
are some more or less convincing explanations for this phenomenon, for example 
the importance of relative wages in wage bargaining, or the real debt resistance 
hypothesis. (Much of the theoretical and empirical evidence is presented in 




























































































discussed in Taheri, 1995). Whatever the reason may be, the present analysis 
suggests that a downward rigidity of money wages is to be welcomed rather than 
criticised. Usually, the downward rigidity of money wages is blamed for the 
existence and persistence of high unemployment. But the analysis shows that 
downward flexible money wages would not reduce the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. On the contrary, the downward rigidity of money wages is 
helpful, because it prevents unanticipated deflation and its costs. Hence, it rather 
supplements a stabilisation policy, which keeps the economy on a path around the 
gravitation centre n*, because the price level is stabilised, except for periods in 
which the rate of employment exceeds its value at n*, and the economic costs of 
deviations are limited to those produced by unanticipated inflation during boom 
periods.
2.4 A rigorous versus a moderate stabilisation policy
1. Without unexpected deflation, all rates of unemployment 1-n with 
(l+m)o)(n)<f are Nairu. When the money wage cannot fall, its ex post value can 
be correctly anticipated so that WE = W. Hence, the real wage follows 
immediately from the determination of competitive prices, i.e. equation (9a), w = 
f/(l+m), is valid for all values n < n*. It is true that employees would accept a 
reduction of the real wage because co(n) < w for n<n*, but this is prevented by 
the downward rigidity of money wages.
A lot of empirical evidence shows that monetary authorities are apparently 
inclined to use the existence of multiple Nairu for a more rigorous stabilisation 
of the price level. It is debatable whether they would accept movements around 
n* if each temporary inflation was balanced by a corresponding deflation in such 
a way that the price level remained stable on average. But very often their 
preferred objective seems to be to avoid inflation altogether. This ambitious target 
can only be achieved when the rate of employment, around which the economy 
oscillates, is below n*. In an economy with downward flexible money wages, 
such a policy would be irrational, because it would simply replace unexpected 
inflation by unexpected deflation. However, with downward rigid money wages, 
the monetary authorities can choose a centre of gravitation n° < n* from the 
multiplicity of rates of employment which are Nairu. This can be done in such a 
way that positive deviations from this centre will not propel the rate of 
employment into the inflationary domain. One might call this a "rigorous" 
stabilisation policy, and n° a "rigorous" Nairu, as compared to a "moderate" 
stabilisation policy with the focus on a "moderate" Nairu n*. (The paper by 




























































































The principal idea behind such a policy seems to be that the total 
elimination of unexpected inflation would maximise the rate of savings. The 
corresponding increase of the capital stock should then allow a rate of non- 
inflationary unemployment n° which is higher than n* under a moderate 
stabilisation policy . This idea can be formalised in the following way. If (l+v)n° 
(v>0) is the highest positive deviation from n° , the target rate of employment 
which completely prevents inflationary pressure must be chosen according to
(12) f{(n/k)°}/(l+m) = (o{(l+v)n°}
In this way, all rates of employment are confined to an interval in which the 
condition (l+m)co<f holds, and every rate of unemployment is Nairu. Now 
assume that s° is the rate of savings induced by a rigorous stabilisation policy. It 
determines the labour intensity (n/k)° according to equation (3b) in the following
way:
(3b)' f{(n/k)°} = g/s°.
Equations (3b)’ and (12) together determine k° and n°.
These values must be compared with the values k* and n* which 
correspond to a moderate stabilisation policy. They are determined by equation 
(10) and equation (3b) for s = s*, where s* is the rate of savings induced by the 
centre of gravitation n*. The basic idea of a rigorous stabilisation policy can now 
be expressed with the help of figure 2.
(f)V(Um ) 
(07(1+m)






























































































As n° is a non-inflationary solution (whereas n* admits temporary unexpected 
inflation), it provides an incentive for a higher rate of savings, s° > s*. As a result, 
the capital intensity of production is also higher in n°, (n/k)° < (n/k)*. Even for a 
positive value of v , it is therefore possible that (1+ v)(n/k)° < (n/k)*. A 
comparison of equations (10) and (12) shows that this implies (l+v)n° > n*, or 
(1+ v)k°(n/k)° > k*(n/k)*. In this case, a rigorous stabilisation policy would be 
justified. It would raise the capital stock (k° > k*) and in this way create 
additional employment opportunities, so that the average rate of employment, n° 
> n*, would indeed be higher.
2. As the preceding analysis shows, the success of a rigorous stabilisation policy 
is guaranteed only if it induces a sufficient amount of additional savings. If the 
difference between s° and s* is small, (n/k)°<(n/k)* is still valid, but now (1+ 
v)(n/k)° > (n/k)* becomes possible. A comparison of equations (10) and (12) 
shows that this implies (1+ v)n° < n* so that n° < n*. Furthermore, (1+ v)k°(n/k)° 
< k*(n/k)*. It immediately follows that k° < k*. Hence, a rigorous stabilisation 
policy would fail to increase the capital stock, and the target rate of employment 
n° would remain below the moderate value n* of NAIRU. Figure 3 illustrates this 
result.
figure 3
It is an open question whether the difference in the savings rate is big 
enough to raise the marginal productivity of labour by a sufficient amount. There 
is some reason to doubt it. If the unexpected inflation, which is tolerated by a 
moderate stabilisation policy, is also moderate, it will not hurt capital investment 
very much, and there will be no substantial decline in savings. Arguments in 




























































































second, that it remains limited because P/PE = co(n)(l+m)/f '< co(l)/ w {see 
equation (6a)}.
If a moderate stabilisation policy does not imply a significant decline in the 
capital stock, the difference between n* and n° is determined mainly by the extent 
of positive deviations from n°. In the case in which savings don't differ at all, n*- 
n° simply corresponds to the maximum positive deviation expected.
3. An important property of a rigorous stabilisation policy is the permanent 
exclusion from the primary sector of a certain proportion of the total labour 
supply. Its likely consequence will be that some individuals will never get a 
chance of becoming employed in this sector. If they remain unemployed, they 
also tend to lose the productive abilities required for working there, so that they 
eventually become really unable to compete for jobs in the primary sector. In this 
way, the competitive pressure from unemployed individuals, which determines 
the bargaining power of the insiders of the primary sector, is weakened. 
Consequently, a higher rate of unemployment is required in order to eliminate an 
inflationary pressure. (This problem has been examined in several studies. See, 
for example, Carlin and Soskice, 1990, ch.19.3)
In order to specify the potential outcome within the framework of the 
present model, one has to distinguish between the total labour force L and the 
effective amount of labour L<L supplied to the primary sector. Under a rigorous 
stabilisation policy, [l-(l+v)n°]L potential workers are never employed there. 
Assume that in each period y[l-(l+v)n°]L of them, (0<y<l), lose the ability to 
compete for a job in the primary sector and drop out of the effective labour 
supply. Some of them may be leaving the labour force anyway, mainly because of 
old age. Assume that their number is 8l , and that they can be replaced by well- 
trained (young) persons, so that the total labour force L remains constant. If the 
number of those who drop out exceeds the number of those who retire, 8L< y[l- 
(l+v)n°]L, the effective labour supply declines, until a steady state solution is 
obtained at which
L/L =S/x[l-(l+v)n°]< 1.
The average total rate of employment in the primary sector, nL/L , would then 
shrink correspondingly. Even if 8 is only slightly less than y[l-(l+v)n°], the 
impact on the total rate of unemployment, 1-nL/L , could be considerable (for 





























































































A moderate stabilisation policy could avoid such an increase in total 
unemployment, because it occasionally allows high rates of employment or even 
full employment. When the rate of permanent unemployment is low, it is likely 
that those who drop out of the effective labour supply, because their productivity 
has fallen, belong to the group of people who are retiring anyway. In this case, 
the effective labour supply remains constant at its initial value L.
2.5 Stabilisation policy and the welfare state
1. When the economy is stabilised at Nairu, (l-n)L workers are excluded from 
the primary sector, because they cannot successfully compete with insiders. They 
can either move to the secondary sector, or they can remain unemployed. The 
secondary sector is a competitive sector, in which labour is the only factor of 
production. The average and marginal productivity of labour is x. As there is 
perfect competition, x is also the real income of a worker in this sector. The 
special feature of this income is that it is uncertain and that its expected value x = 
Ex is low compared to the productivity of the primary sector, E x « f .  The 
expected utility of an individual working in the secondary sector is E[u(x)]-e. It 
can be very low, if many jobs are badly paid, and if individuals are very risk 
averse. In this case, the individuals, who are forced to work in the secondary 
sector, must be regarded as the victims of the stabilisation policy. In order to 
improve their prospect, one could consider an insurance which guarantees a 
minimum income, for example the average income x = Ex. However, this may 
give rise to the familiar moral hazard problem. Workers may reduce their effort, 
but claim that their income is low because their job is so bad. If it is too 
expensive to observe the true level of effort, the compensation must be paid in 
any case. A simple version of the formal argument can be presented in the 
following way. Assume that workers can reduce their effort level e to 0 without
being observed. They will prefer to do this if (x){ 1 - d>(x)} > Ju(x)d<I>(x)- e,
where d>(x) is the distribution function of x. For example, if x=x+ with probability 
q and x=0 with probability 1-q, the corresponding condition would be u(x) > 
u(x+)-e/q.
In this case, the elimination of uncertainty would virtually amount to the 
provision of unemployment benefits. It is obvious that these benefits would have 
to be financed by the income recipients of the primary sector. In the simple 
setting of the present model, a regular scheme of unemployment compensations 
makes sense only if the unemployment benefit b is high enough to guarantee that 
u(b) > Eu(x)-e. In this case, unemployment is preferred to working in the 
secondary sector. If this insurance scheme is to be financed by those employed in 




























































































The decision, whether there is sufficient unemployment compensation or 
not, affects the reservation wage, and hence the rate of emmployment. With no 
unemployment, the reservation wage cor of the primary labour market is 
determined by u(ci)r) = Eu(x) or
g>r = u''{Eu(x)}. At Nairu, the real wage of the primary sector is the sum of this 
reservation wage and entry costs, w= cdr + cogCn). In a steady state equilibrium, w 
= f(n/k)/(l+m), and n/k follows from (3a) or (3b). Hence, w can be regarded as 
given. The equilibrium rate of employment n* is then determined by the condition
(13a) C0E(n*) = w - u’'{Eu(x)}.
If Eu(x) is very low compared to w, entry costs must be correspondingly high. 
This is the case at a high rate of employment n*. Therefore, a low expected utility 
in the secondary sector is a favourable condition for stabilising the price level at a 
high rate of employment in the primary sector. With sufficient unemployment 
benefits, the reservation wage g>r of the primary sector has to satisfy the equality 
u{(Or - b[(L/nL)-l]}- e = u(b). Once again, the equilibrium real wage w=cor + (De 
is determined by exogenous parameters, w - f(n/k)/(l+m), and n/k from (3a) or 
(3b). Hence, the rate of employment is now given by
(13b) 00E(n*) + b[(L/nL)-l] = w- u"'{u(b)+e}.
A comparison with equation (13a) shows the obvious result that the rate of 
employment in the primary sector is lower than in an economy without 
unemployment benefits.
In spite of this disadvantage, individuals might opt for an unemployment 
compensation scheme, when they consider the risk of becoming unemployed. 
With no compensation system, the individual utility level will be either u(w)-e, or 
Eu(x)-e. With unemployment compensation, the corresponding utility levels are 
either u{w-b[(L/nL)-l]}-e < u(w)-e, or u(b) >Eu(x)-e. Even employed 
individuals might then prefer the solution with unemployment compensation, if 
they are sufficiently risk averse. They can also enforce such a solution, because 
they have the majority of votes in the political decision-making process.
However, under a rigorous stabilisation policy, unemployment may be very 
high. In this case, the contribution to unemployment compensation, b[(L/nL)-l), 
can also be rather high, because it goes up with a falling value of n, which also 
increases L/L. As unemployment benefits become more expensive, one should 




























































































primary sector, who decide the political outcome, might opt for a reduction. It is 
conceivable that this reduction is so substantial that people would prefer working 
in the secondary sector to being unemployed. In this way, a high rate of 
employment in the secondary sector together with a low rate of unemployment 
may simply indicate an optimal reaction to a rigorous stabilisation policy.
2. Furthermore, a policy which implies high unemployment raises the general tax 
burden. This might lead to a decline of the optimal size of the welfare state. 
Assume that tL is the quantity of a public good (the size of the welfare state) 
which is financed by the employees of the primary sector. Then each of them has 
to contribute tL/nL. Again, the burden of the contribution rises with a falling rate 
of employment. (The basic argument of the analysis remains valid, if the 
recipients of capital income and profits are also taken into account).
Hence, a rising rate of unemployment reduces the disposable income w- 
tL/nL. A lower disposable income would probably reduce the savings rate s. This 
would aggravate the negative impact, because it would also reduce the real wage 
w {see equations (9a) and (3b)}. A usual utility function, which considers the 
public good (or the size of the welfare state), is u(w-tL/nL, t). It shows the 
possible trade-off between the public good and its costs. It is easy to see that the 
optimal value of t , which maximises u, declines with a falling value of n , for two 
reasons. First, there is a negative substitution effect due to the higher price of the 
public good. Second, there is also a negative income effect due to the contraction 
of the disposable income.Therefore, the employees of the primary sector will 
prefer a lower value of t , i.e. a reduced size of the welfare state. They can 
probably accomplish this result, because they have the majority of votes in the 
political decision-making process.
A reduction of the size of the welfare state shifts the curve of the bargained 
wage downward, because it lowers the reservation wage. It may also shift the 
curve w=f/(l+m) upward, if it raises the rate of savings. Hence, such a reduction 
would to some extent reverse the negative impact on the employment rate (see 
figures).
A reduction of the high rate of unemployment will be even more important, 
if there are additional costs of a low rate of employment in the primary sector. It 
is well known, for example, that the crime rate of a society is positively related to 
the unemployment rate (and also to the rate of employment in the secondary 
sector of the economy). Hence, the costs of criminality will go up with a declining 
rate of employment. Their existence provides an additional incentive to raise the 




























































































3. Some conclusions for unemployment and stabilisation policy in Europe
1. The purpose of this analysis has been to shed some light on the likely causes 
and also on possible cures of high unemployment in European countries. Nobody 
can deny that the persistence of high unemployment has substantially contributed 
to the complete elimination of unexpected inflation. This indicates convincingly 
that European employment has, indeed, been determined by some Nairu. 
Furthermore, there is some clear evidence that this state of Nairu has mainly 
been achieved by a more or less rigorous stabilisation policy (see, for example, L. 
Ball, 1996). As a matter of fact, there were only two periods of unexpected 
inflation in Europe after the Second World War. Each of them was triggered by 
an oil price shock, and both were successfully removed after some time by a 
restrictive monetary policy. This view is confirmed by the way in which the 
monetary authorities themselves have usually assessed their own policy and its 
consequences (see, for example, the study of BeiBinger, 1996, for Germany).
2. Most supporters of a determined stabilisation policy would deny, however, that 
this poliy is responsible for the high rate of unemployment. According to 
conventional wisdom, this phenomenon is due to an unusually high value of 
Nairu, caused by some structural reasons.such as high wages and a shortage of 
capital in relation to the supply of labour. In the context of the model presented 
above, the argument is that even the moderate value of Nairu, i.e. 1-n*, is too 
high to permit price stability without a lot of unemployment. According to the 
model, n* is determined by the intersection of f(n/k)/(l+m) and co(n) {see 
equation (10)), where the steady state value of n/k follows from either r=r {see 
equation (3a)), or f(n/k)=g/s {see equation (3b)}. Hence, n* could, indeed, be 
low for the reasons mentioned above. First, the wage demand, expressed by co(n), 
could be comparatively high, and second, the marginal productivity of labour, f  , 
could be comparatively low. There is some evidence that f  has recently come 
under some pressure by an increased rate of technical progress. However, the 
main explanation could be a relative shortage of capital caused by the intensified 
global competition for capital (given an abundant supply of labour), which 
increases the real rate of interest, but basically by an insufficient rate of savings.
The obvious proposals for raising employment, which follow from this 
diagnosis, are a reduction of the wage pressure and a promotion of savings. 
Among several measures suggested (and partly implemented), a relief of the tax 
burden and of unemployment benefits has received the greatest attention. This is 
plausible. Lower taxes on wage income and reduced contributions to 
unemployment insurance decrease the reservation wage and hence the wage 




























































































income, are likely to generate more savings which raise the capital stock and in 
this way the marginal productivity of labour.
It is conceivable that this policy can indeed reduce the rate of 
unemployment, without at the same time sacrificing the target of a stable price 
level. The experience of the US economy with its low rate of both unemployment 
and inflation seems to confirm this hope. On the other hand, it is exactly this same 
experience which casts some doubt on the desirability of the ensuing structure, 
especially with respect to the rate of employment in the primary sector, and the 
eventual size of the welfare state. A low rate of unemployment, which is coupled 
with a fairly high rate of employment in the less productive secondary sector, and 
with a trimmed welfare state, may arouse the suspicion that it could be simply the 
result of a rigorous stabilisation policy.
3. With this perception in mind, an alternative explanation of the European 
experience would suggest that, besides some structural causes, a rigorous 
stabilisation policy also has been an important source of high unemployment. This 
view seems to be confirmed by empirical research on the reasons of European 
unemplyoment (see, for example, the survey by Bean, 1994). There is apparently 
no convincing evidence that a significant part of the unemplyoment could be 
explained by structural changes, whereas the role of monetary constraints for the 
rise in unemployment is confirmed. Recessions, which caused the rise in 
unemployment rates, were regularly initiated by restrictive monetary measures 
(there is a vast literature, which tends to confirm this view. See, for example, 
Romer and Romer 1994a and 1994b).
This explanation suggests a transition to a moderate stabilisation policy, 
which tries to establish n* instead of n° as a long run centre of gravitation, and 
which tolerates economic upswings even if they provoke some unexpected 
inflation. A clear advantage of this step would be a higher average rate of 
employment in the primary sector. Furhtermore, it would probably obstruct the 
excessive cutback of the welfare state, and especially of unemployment 
compensations, which has been proposed and already partly implemented. Those, 
who cannot find a job in the primary sector, would then still have a fair chance of 
choosing between taking a job in the secondary sector or being unemployed. This 
is not to deny that there is also sound reason for a reduction of high budget 
deficits and taxes, which could contribute to an increase of capital formation and 
employment. However, these reductions could be limited, if it is really the case 
that the optimal size of the welfare state is greater under a moderate rather than a 
rigorous stabilisation policy. Finally, stabilising the economy around the moderate 
Nairu would be advantageous for the employees of the primary sector, because 




























































































4. The shift to a moderate stabilisation policy would probably not require any 
spectacular expansionary measures, but just a credible commitment from the 
monetary authorities that they would be prepared to accept n* instead of n° as a 
centre of gravitation, and that they would tolerate some temporary inflation 
caused by positive deviations from this centre. Such a commitment would 
presumably induce the economic agents to regard n* as the long run equilibrium 
position of the economy and to adjust their plans accordingly. Still, one should 
not expect an immediate success of this transition. The reduction of the rate of 
unemployment would be retarded, because the accumulation of capital necessary 
to support n* instead of n° takes some time (remember, that n* and n° are steady 
state values. A similar point is made in Rowthom, 1995).
A single country might find it difficult, if not impossible, to shift to a 
moderate stabilisation policy, because the tolerance of an unexpected inflation 
might provoke an outflow of capital. The same problem arises with respect to the 
adequate choice of welfare expenditures, because higher taxes, especially on 
capital income, may also induce a corresponding loss of capital. Presently, the 
general impression is rather that countries are in a race for more stabilisation and 
less welfare, in order to attract capital from each other. It is obvious that this 
competition is simply the futile result of a prisoners' dilemma. But this kind of 
behaviour demonstrates that the suggested transition is only possible if an 
extremely important condition is satisfied: The move would have to be supported 
by all, or at least by the most influential, monetary institutions. A serious attempt 
to shift to a moderate stabilisation policy generally requires credible commitments 
from all parties involved.
The most serious obstacle to this transition is probably the widespread 
belief that the high unemployment is due to the structural factors mentioned 
above, and not the anti-inflationary policy. It is obvious that the present analysis 
cannot simply reject this conventional wisdom on theoretical or even empirical 
grounds. Rather, the purpose of this analysis has been to demonstrate that the 
persistence of high unemployment might also be due to a rigorous stabilisation 
policy, and that in this case, the attempt to reduce unemployment by a rigorous 
reduction of the welfare state could be misguided. The analysis intends to show 
that these conclusions cannot be rejected on purely theoretical grounds, so that a 
final judgement has to rely on empirical considerations. As there is also some 
empirical evidence in support of the view presented here, this view should 
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